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COMMENTS
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS UNDER RULE 1 Ob-5
PROCEDURAL RELATIONS
by Rufus S. Scott
With the development of a securities-centered economy in the United
States, there has been a concomitant rise in the importance of securities
regulation and litigation. A major component of this rise has been the
private action against violators of SEC Rule lob-5.' This private right of
action, which the federal courts have created by implication from the
broad prohibitory language of the rule' and section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,' is similar to the common law actions of
fraud and deceit, which are the traditional remedies for fraud and mis-
representation in securities transactions. As it has developed, however,
the lob-5 action has acquired an omniscience which has taken federal
law into areas of corporate life previously solely within state regulation.!
As this growth continues, it becomes important to delineate and discern
the territorial boundary between federal and state law under lob-5. The
purpose of this Comment is to point out the survey stakes along this
boundary.
This boundary begins-and in a sense, ends-with the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' Section 27 of the Act
provides that federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of the Act and the rules promulgated under it.! Section 28 of the Act,
' The leading case is Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Pro-
fessor Loss has collected the subsequent cases. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1763 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
Rule lob-5 takes on different meanings and serves different purposes in different contexts.
Since this Comment is concerned basically with the procedural law surrounding the rule, no attempt
is made here to distinguish between its various meanings. Instead, the conduct which may violate
the rule is denominated "fraud" or "securities fraud" in the very broadest sense of those terms.
SEC Rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
a The statute provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . ..
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe .. .in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964). Hereinafter, the Securities Exchange Act will be cited as "Exchange Act"
or "SEA."
4A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD-S.E.C. RULE 10b-5, S 2.7(1) (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG]; 3 Loss 1430-44; see Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 100, 102 (3d ed. 1964).
'See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965);
Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1b-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE
L.J. 1120 (1950).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
"The section provides:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal pro-
ceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by
1969] COMMENTS
however, specifically preserves to litigants all rights and remedies avail-
able under state common law.' Like some other areas of federal regula-
tion,9 therefore, 10b-5 actions must be brought in federal court, but un-
like other areas of federal regulation," Congress has not chosen to pre-
empt the states from dealing with securities fraud. Partly in deference to
the prior state regulation in this field," Congress, when it passed the 1934
act, preserved to the states jurisdiction of securities transactions. Although
they may not hear actions arising under lob-5, the states thus can con-
tinue to deal with securities fraud and misrepresentation and may give
whatever redress they deem appropriate under state law.
Thus the jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act authorize con-
current federal-state jurisdiction of securities transactions, while confer-
ring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts for violations of the Act. 2
Under the American dual judicial system, this state of affairs inevitably
leads to conflicts between federal and state courts." Thus the courts of
each judicial system must decide the scope of their jurisdiction under the
Act, 4 the law-federal or state-to be applied to securities actions,"2 and
the weight to be accorded each other's judgments.
I. JURISDICTION
On the surface, the Exchange Act clearly spells out the jurisdiction of
the state and federal courts. But does it? The Act specifies the exclusive
and non-exclusive aspects of federal court jurisdiction in sections 27 and
28, but that alone does not foreclose jurisdictional questions. Exclusive
jurisdiction of 10b-5 actions is given to the federal courts, but the Act
does not indicate the competency of the federal courts to hear securities
fraud claims arising under state law. Nor does it indicate the applicability
of the broad venue and service of process provisions of the Act to purely
this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder . . . may be brought in any such
district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
gThe section provides in part:
(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall
recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in
excess of his actual damages ....
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964).
'E.g., labor relations, San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
patents and copyrights, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
"°E.g., labor relations: San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
" Some states began active securities regulation, partly through blue sky laws and partly as a
matter of common law, in the early twentieth century. See 1 Loss 23.
" Interpreting the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEA, some courts have observed that the exclu-
sive jurisdiction provided in § 27 is exclusive only to the extent that the federal law provides a
right of recovery which goes beyond the common law rights. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786
(N.D. Ill. 1954), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955); cf. McCollum v. Billings, 53
Misc. 2d 661, 279 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
"See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. RaV. 489 (1954).
14 See section I infra.
"' See section II infra.
'6 See section III infra.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
state matters. At the other extreme the Act does not disclose the compe-
tency of state courts to consider lob-5 questions raised incidentally, or by
way of defense or counterclaim in a state court proceeding.
In other fields it is not uncommon for issues within the exclusive jur-
isdiction of the federal courts to arise incidentally in state court proceed-
ings." For example, questions concerning the validity of patents, a sub-
ject within exclusive federal jurisdiction, 8 occasionally are raised in breach
of contract actions."' When such questions are presented, state courts are
ordinarily competent to hear and decide the issues, despite the fact that
they could not assume jurisdiction of such issues if they were presented as
the plaintiff's cause of action."' Likewise, questions of securities law may
arise in state courts incidental to some non-securities law action, but they
will be dismissed."
Unlike other concepts of exclusive jurisdiction, the jurisdiction pro-
vided by the Exchange Act precludes a state court from considering any
matters dealing with 10b-5." Probably, this phenomenon is a result of the
language of section 27 of the Act, which gives federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of the Act." Ordinarily, the statutory basis of ex-
clusive federal court jurisdiction is couched in terms of jurisdiction of ac-
tions arising under the federal statute. Hence, there is nothing to bar a
state court from deciding questions of federal law in state court actions
which do not "arise under" the federal statutes. Under the SEA, how-
ever, any violation of an Exchange Act provision is within exclusive fed-
eral court jurisdiction, so no state court can properly consider any issue
which involves a violation of the Act. Although it can be argued that the
implied right of action for violation of lob-5 does not actually "arise
under" the Exchange Act,"s the conduct which gives rise to this right of
action is, by definition, conduct which violates a rule promulgated under
17 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.208[4], at 2325 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
'828 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
1"E.g., Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967) (en
banc); Respro Inc. v. Worcester Backing Co., 291 Mass. 467, 197 N.E. 198 (1935).
2"Id.; 1A MOORE 55 0.208[4], 0.213[2].
"'Reuben Rose & Co. v. Davon Associates, Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,109 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 7, 1967) (defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims dismissed because they relied
on Exchange Act). But see Southern Brokerage Co. v. Cannarsa, 405 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966), error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1004 (1967) (state court, without noting jurisdic-
tional features of Exchange Act, considered the merits of defendant's Exchange Act defenses to
breach of contract action).
" E.g., Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, 29 Del. Ch. 365, 51 A.2d 572
(Sup. Ct. 1947); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952);
Mitchell v. Bache & Co., 52 Misc. 2d 985, 277 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. City Court 1966);*Gallo v.
Mayer, 50 Misc. 2d 385, 270 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See also Loss, The SEC Proxy'Rules
and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1254-63 (1960).
23 See note 7 supra.
24 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964) (patents and copyrights).
a The 1ob-5 action is probably a form of common law tort which arises because a statute (or,
more correctly a rule) enacted for the protection of a particular group of persons has been violated.
See text accompanying note 2 supra. Though the rule provides the standards by which the duty
owed is measured, the cause of action actually arises under common law tort concepts, not under the
statute itself. Thus it is distinguishable from the express civil liability provisions contained in the




the Exchange Act." Thus the state courts are correct when they refuse to
consider lob-5 questions arising in state court actions.
The drawback to this exclusive jurisdiction lies in the fact that the
same conduct may violate both 10b-5 and state law duties prohibiting
fraud and misrepresentation." When this occurs, the plaintiff can assert
claims under either state law or federal law, but he cannot assert both in a
state court because of the exclusive jurisdiction over 10b-5 claims given
to the federal courts." Considerations of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel make it desirable for him to litigate both state and federal claims in
the same forum, for an adverse judgment in a state court on his state
claims may bar the plaintiff from asserting his federal claims later, and
vice versa.
Fortunately, the federal court doctrine of pendent jurisdiction' pro-
vides the plaintiff with a means of asserting both federal and state claims
in the same forum. Although pendent jurisdiction is a matter within the
court's discretion,"1 the current trend is toward allowing state claims pen-
dent to federal claims in all areas of federal court jurisdiction, including
10b-5 actions. 2 The fact that both claims arise out of the same transac-
tion, requiring similar proof, and the similarity of common law to the
10b-5 action all suggest that the state claims should be allowed into fed-
eral court pendent to the federal claims."3 However, when the state claims
come in, they never lose their character as state claims." State law con-
tinues to govern them, even though federal law would require a different
result on the same issue." The use of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
in lOb-5 actions does create at least one federal-state conflict: to what
extent should the broad personal jurisdiction and service of process provi-
sions of the Exchange Act allow the plaintiff to assert as pendent claims
matters of state law which could not be asserted in a court of the forum
state?
Exercising its broad powers over interstate commerce, Congress, in sec-
2" If the conduct does not violate the provisions of lob-5, the duty implied from those provisions
is not breached; hence, no cause of action arises.2 E.g., Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
28 BROMBERG § 2.7(3), at 57-58; see note 7 supra.
" See the discussion of res judicata and collateral estoppel at section III infra.
0 Under this doctrine, when a federal court has properly assumed jurisdiction over federal claims,
the court may assume jurisdiction over state claims springing from the same nucleus of operative
fact as the federal claims. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In Gibbs the Court modified
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which had been based on a more restrictive view that the state
claims had to be based on the same cause of action as the federal claims. Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238 (1933); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (1963); see Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1040, 1115-20
(1966).
3aUMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
" See Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 474
(1967); cf. BROMBERG § 2.7(3).
33 Lowenfels, supra note 32, at 486.
4 E.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Note, Problems
of Parallel State & Federal Remedies, 71 HARv. L. RueV. 513, 517 (1958). Although Erie is strictly
applicable only when the federal court is exercising its diversity jurisdiction, most federal courts
apply the concepts developed there to pendent state claims, despite the fact that the court must
therefore apply two systems of law in the same lawsuit. Id. See generally Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964).
35 See text accompanying note 109 infra; cf. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D.
Del. 1953), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
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tion 27 of the Act, has authorized nation-wide service of process and has
afforded very broad venue provisions.' Under this section, the defendant
may be served wherever he may be found, and venue will lie in any dis-
trict where any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred,
where the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business."
Applied to federal claims, these broad provisions clearly are appropriate
devices to further the national regulatory scheme enacted by Congress."8
But when they are applied to state claims which are in federal court pen-
dent to lob-5 claims, these venue and service provisions give the state
claims a new reach. Ordinarily, state court jurisdiction is considered ter-
ritorial in character; a state's courts cannot reach beyond its borders to
assert jurisdiction over persons and things outside the state." Today, the
concept of state court jurisdiction is actually much broader than this con-
ventional notion suggests; long-arm statutes, the notion of minimum con-
tacts, and non-resident motorist statutes have all combined to expand the
old notions of state court jurisdiction." However, probably no one would
argue at the present time that any state court could issue process which
would reach beyond its borders in all cases, regardless of the connection
between the defendant and the state.
Absent some special concept which would enable the state court to
obtain jurisdiction over him, a state court hearing a common law claim
for securities fraud could not obtain jurisdiction over the person of a non-
resident defendant. Therefore, when a common law claim is asserted in a
federal court pendent to a lob-5 claim, should the federal court allow
the plaintiff the benefit of the broad jurisdiction and venue provisions of
section 27 of the SEA on his state claim? Most courts have said no,4' but a
few 4' have allowed it on the ground that judicial economy and the con-
venience of the parties are better served if all legal theories arising out of
the same set of operative facts are considered in the same action.4' There
is some merit to this argument, but it may work a hardship on the de-
"8 Cf. BROMBERG § 11.3; note 7 supra.
"See Gilson v. Pittsburgh Forgings Co., 284 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Zorn v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of America, 237 F. Supp.
971 (D. Del. 1964).
"Cf. Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
Miskin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 810 (1957).
as See H. GOODRICH & E. SCoLEs, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 72, 73 (1964).4 See id. §§ 73, at 124-30, 76. It should be remembered, however, that the concepts of extra-
territorial jurisdiction and service of process are not necessarily the same as those associated with
SEA § 27. The idea of "contact" with a particular 'jurisdiction is not present in § 27 except as
it is relevant to the "transacting business" basis for venue. See note 7 supra. Even there, the quan-
tum of business done is not the same as that under state notions of "doing business" or "minimum
contacts." Zorn v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United Indus. Corp. v.'Nuclear
Corp. of America, 237 F. Supp. 971 (D. Del. 1964). But 'the state concepts may be relevant as
considerations for the court in determining the standard under SEA § 27. Cf. Gilson v. Pittsburgh
Forgings Co., 284 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). -
41 BROMBERG § 11.4; e.g., Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp." 267, 271 (D.
Colo. 1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801; 804 (D. Colo. 1965).4
2BROMBERO § 2.7(4); e.g., Puma v. Marriott, 294 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Del. 1969); Kane v.
Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).4
'Puma v. Marriott, 294 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (D. Del. 1969).
[Vol. 23
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fendant, and it can be argued that it constitutes an improper use of the
jurisdictional features of the Exchange Act."
If there is no concept in state law under which the plaintiff could ob-
tain jurisdiction over the defendant on the state claims, extension of the
broad jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act to the pendent state
claims subjects the defendant to liability which the state courts could not
impose. If the federal court is really acting as a court of the state on the
pendent claims,"5 the federal court should not utilize special federal juris-
dictional provisions to give relief on claims which a state court could not
entertain. In allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction on the pendent state
claims, the court actually creates a hybrid sort of claim, which is really
neither state nor federal in character. Though arising under state law, the
claim cannot be called a state claim, for it can be enforced only in con-
junction with federal jurisdictional provisions. It cannot be called a federal
claim either, for it does not arise under federal law. Although this extra-
territorial reach given the state claims by coupling them with federal
jurisdictional powers may not be inherently evil, creation of these hybrid
claims is judicial legislation of the sort which federal courts ordinarily
disdain.'
II. THE LAW APPLIED IN lob-5 ACTIONS
After these jurisdictional conflicts are resolved, a more fundamental
question remains: what shall be the relationship between federal and state
law in actions for securities fraud? ' Because Congress chose not to pre-
empt state court jurisdiction of fraudulent securities transactions, there
exists a viable and fairly complete body of state procedural and substan-
tive law in this field. The federal statutory provisions, however, are far
less complete. Partly because of the nature of federal legislation and partly
because lob-5 was not designed to afford a private right of action, federal
courts, when considering lob-5 actions, must look outside the statute and
rule to find the procedural, and some of the substantive, rules applicable
to the case. Ordinarily, Congress legislates against a background of state
law, and federal courts often look to established state rules to fill the in-
terstices left in federal legislation. 8 However, when that legislation in-
volves a complete national scheme of regulation, the federal court must
44See text accompanying note 123 infra.
4 See note 34 supra.
4' As concepts of extraterritorial jurisdiction by state courts expand, this concern becomes less
important. Even now, many fraudulent activities carried out within a state would subject the
nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the state's courts by virtue of the state long-arm statute.
There is still a danger, however, that the defendant will be put to undue inconvenience by a
plaintiff using SEA § 27, and this inconvenience comes long before it has been determined by the
court that the defendant wears a black hat. As Lewis Lowenfels notes,'the use of pendent juris-
diction as a device to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on pendent state
claims is subject to abuse and should be scrutinized carefully by the court. Lowenfels, supra note
32, at 492.
47 See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 383 (1964); Miskin, supra note 38.
41 Miskin, supra note 38, at 811.
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also consider whether a better approach would be to formulate a separate
federal rule to fill out the national scheme. 9
Thus a dilemma presents itself for the federal court in choosing the law
applicable to a lob-5 action. A principal explanation for the creation and
rapid expansion of the private right of action under lob-5 is that investors
need an action free from the substantive and procedural restrictions which
have grown like a shell around state court securities fraud actions."0 Sug-
gesting that 10b-5 actions should not be encrusted with this shell, Con-
gress has deprived state courts of jurisdiction of 10b-5 violations; yet
blind adherence to prevailing state rules in filling the interstices of 10b-5
would engraft these restrictions on the federal action. Because the fifty
states differ in their own rules on these matters, adoption of state rules also
encourages forum shopping, for the broad personal jurisdiction and venue
provisions of the Exchange Act often permit suit in federal courts sitting
in several states.' If the federal court adopts the law of the state in which
it sits, the law applicable to lob-5 actions varies among the federal district
courts, and litigants seek the forum state with rules most favorable to
them.
At the other extreme, too much judicial creation by the federal courts
produces confusion and hardship for those who must conduct their busi-
ness affairs under this creation." Uniformity of federal rules may be
achieved, but the price may be a disparity between state and federal law
applicable to the citizens of a state. While this disparity is irrelevant if
the need for national uniformity is strong, the citizen perhaps should not
be put to the burden of having his conduct governed by two differing
standards where the only reason for a separate federal rule is a desire for
symmetry of abstract legal principles. The states, too, have an interest in
having their law applied in federal actions. That law reflects state policies
as to permissible conduct. If the federal courts formulate their own rules,
overriding state concepts in the federal action, the state rules may be
vitiated.
In view of these competing considerations, common sense suggests that
the choice of federal or state law cannot be determined in one simple for-
mula. Unquestionably, Congress does not expect or desire the federal
courts to create new federal rules whenever an issue arises which is not
expressly provided for in lob-5. Rather, the courts must consider the re-
lationship of each issue which arises to the national program." Where there
is no need for a uniform rule among the federal courts and where the
state courts have already devised a just and workable procedure, there is
no reason to create a separate federal approach. Making this determina-
tion, however, is easier said in the abstract than done in reality. For-
tunately, the United States Supreme Court has provided the lower courts
with some guidance in choosing the applicable law. By way of dictum in




"See text accompanying note 36 supra; cf. note 7 supra.
1 Friendly, supra note 47, at 410; Miskin, supra note 38, at 822.
" Friendly, supra note 47, at 410.
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J.I. Case Co. v. Borak," the Supreme Court recognized the power of the
federal courts to fashion new federal rules in actions based on Exchange
Act violations, even to the extent of overriding provisions of state law."
There is nothing unique in this approach; the Court has recognized the
same power to fashion federal rules in other areas of federal legislation."
However, Borak has served as the base upon which federal courts have
built a body of federal law governing private lob-5 actions. Although
resort to state law has not been eliminated, the federal law formulated in
this process has departed sufficiently from the conventional state rules
that the lob-5 action probably can now be called a unique type of action
for securities fraud, not just a federal court extension of the common
law actions of fraud and deceit."
Remedies. The question involved in Borak was the remedy which the
federal courts can give for Exchange Act violations." Where a federal
right is invaded, the Court reasoned, it is necessary to provide appropriate
remedies to effectuate the congressional purpose." In providing these rem-
edies, the court may use any available remedy and, in addition, may
fashion federal remedies."0 Unquestionably, this dictum is sound from the
standpoint of federal-state relations. If federal courts could not fashion
appropriate remedies, the rights created by federal legislation would be
hollow indeed." The national scheme of securities regulation reflected by
the Exchange Act would also suffer, for a toothless act probably would
have little deterrent effect on the fraudulent activities prohibited by
lob-5Y' It seems, therefore, that the remedies provided in the 10b-5 ac-
tion actually lie at the heart of the national scheme, and this scheme can
be effectuated fully only if those remedies are under federal control.
Even if it is assumed that federal law should determine the mode of
redress given, there remains the more philosophical question of what
those remedies should be. In Borak the Court found it unnecessary to in-
dicate what relief would be appropriate."3 However, the usual legal and
equitable devices for securing redress of private injuries seem appropri-
ate models for redress under federal law." In utilizing these traditional
devices, the federal courts usually run into no conflicts with the states, for
5 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964).
5 Id.
56E.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); cf. Friendly, supra
note 47, at 413. Writing before the Supreme Court opinion in Borak, Judge Friendly foresaw
Lincoln Mills as portending that the federal courts would "fashion a corpus of law on the re-
sponsibility of officers and directors. consistent with federal securities legislation; and this, -like the
federal common law of labor, would have supremacy over state law." Id.
" See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment; 78 HARv. L. REV. 1146 (1965).
5sJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964).
59 Id.
"
0 Id.; Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Voege v. American Su-
matra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp.
341, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
a1 Cf. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964). •
"
2Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. S 78b (1964). :6
aJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964).




state courts would give the same remedy or relief if the action had been
commenced before them as a common law action. However, suppose the
state court provides an exclusive remedy in a particular situation. How
far should the federal courts go in awarding a remedy forbidden by the
state courts?
Mergers. It is now clear that lob-5 does apply to fraud in connection
with mergers which involve securities transactions.e" Thus if 10b-5 is vi-
olated in a merger, anyone injured by the violation may commence a
10b-5 action in federal court. Most often, these actions are begun by dis-
gruntled shareholders suing either for their own injury or for that alleged-
ly done to the corporation. State law has attempted to provide for these
disgruntled shareholders through the right to appraisal, whereby dissenting
shareholders can have the value of their stock appraised and can receive
cash from the corporation in exchange for it." Although appraisal pro-
vides necessary relief where the stock has no market value, this relief is
rarely what the disgruntled shareholder desires." Appraisal provides no
device for stopping or remedying the consequences of a fraudulent mer-
ger transaction. The shareholder who sees fraud in the merger thus has no
means of asserting it through the appraisal device; yet, under state law,
appraisal may be his exclusive remedy."8
When the disgruntled shareholder bases his complaint on a violation of
lob-5 and brings his action in federal court, the court must decide whether
to limit the plaintiff's remedies to appraisal or to fashion some other re-
lief, such as enjoining or unscrambling the merger. If the plaintiff is one
whom state law would limit to appraisal rights, the questions of federal-
state relations become pertinent for the federal court in choosing the
proper relief. Restricting a plaintiff to appraisal as his exclusive remedy
reflects a strong state policy on mergers and the extent to which dissenting
shareholders should be able to interfere with merger transactions. To al-
low other relief, such as an injunction against the merger, in federal court
vitiates this state scheme and leads to disunity between federal and state
law, thus encouraging forum shopping.' In addition, the fact that so
many states have made appraisal the dissenting shareholder's exclusive
relief"0 indicates that the policy is a strong one in corporate law and
"SSEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
6 6
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 349 (1961).
s If the stock has a market value, the shareholder who objects to the merger usually can sell
in the market without resort to his judicial remedies if all he wants is out of the corporation.
Usually, however, the shareholder who complains of a merger wants to stay in the corporation as
a stockholder; he just wants to keep it from merging.
68H. HENN, supra note 66, § 349, at 553.
68 When the federal courts look to state law, it is ordinarily the law of the forum state. Thus
any differences between state rules are accentuated, for plaintiffs seek to bring their actions in the
federal district court which will apply the state law most favorable to them. The breadth of the
jurisdictional provisions contained in § 27 usually allows plaintiffs a variety of states in which to
file 1ob-5 actions. The effect is to allow the plaintiffs to select the forum with little concern for
the convenience of the parties. Even if the action is later transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1964), the law of the forum state in which the action is originally brought may still apply. H. L.
Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
78See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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should not be lightly set aside. This uniformity among the states also viti-
ates the argument for uniformity of redress, which is frequently ad-
vanced as a reason for fashioning a separate rule."' Because most states
would confine the shareholder to his appraisal remedy, uniformity of the
redress given by the federal district courts on lob-5 violations would be
little less uniform if the state appraisal remedy were utilized in lieu of a
separate federal remedy.
Nevertheless, the federal circuits which have considered the question
so far have rejected the state remedy of appraisal as the exclusive remedy
for mergers."2 The reasoning behind these cases and that of several district
court opinions" has been that the overriding federal law governs the ap-
propriateness of the redress. While it is an accurate parroting of Borak,74
this reasoning is not helpful in deciding whether to apply exclusively ap-
praisal in a lob-5 action. Certainly, the federal court must determine the
appropriateness of the redress, but that does not mean that the court must
always fashion a separate federal rule; it may choose the state rule as the
appropriate redress.7" What the courts are really getting at in these opin-
ions is a view that appraisal is not the appropriate relief for a violation of
lob-5. To apply appraisal, therefore, would impede the congressional pur-
pose behind the federal statute, and any state remedy or other rule which
impedes that purpose must give way to another rule."'
Perhaps the question comes into sharper focus if less stress is placed on
the exclusiveness of the remedy of appraisal in state court proceedings.
For the shareholder who merely dissents from a merger, appraisal is the
exclusive remedy, but where fraud is involved in the merger, many, if
not all, states would allow other forms of redress. 7 Although 10b-5 may
make fraudulent some activities which state fraud law would condone,"'
the 1ob-5 action can be looked upon as similar to a state court action for
fraud in connection with the merger. Thus the plaintiff is not a share-
holder who merely dissents from the merger; he is complaining that the
transaction itself involves some species of fraud. Hence appraisal would
not be the plaintiff's exclusive remedy if the fraud were actionable in
state court, so there is no conflict with state law when the federal court
applies a remedy other than appraisal.
Application of the Borak notions of federal-state relations is also re-
flected in several cases dealing with other aspects of the remedy given in
lob-5 actions. Thus the effect of a release given in a state action upon
the plaintiff's rights in a subsequent lob-5 action is a question of federal
"'Cf. Miskin, supra note 38, at 812-13.
7 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Bard v. Dasho,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
'a Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
4 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964).
71Miskin, supra note 38, at 805.
7Fleischer, supra note 57, at 1170.
" E.g., Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dictum); Voege v. American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965) (dictum).
7 See generally 3 Loss 1430-44.
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law." Likewise, whether the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on
his lob-5 claim"0 and whether an attorney is entitled to a fee from the
corporation for his role in prosecuting a derivative action under the Ex-
change Act"5 are questions to be decided according to federal law. These
cases, however, point out the ongoing role which state law must play in
fashioning remedies for lob-5 actions. Although deciding these questions
for themselves without being required to follow state law, the courts have
observed by way of dictum that the rules generally followed by state
courts are relevant considerations for the federal courts in fashioning fed-
eral law."2
Security for Expenses. One area in which federal courts have rejected a
state procedural requirement is the security for expenses imposed by
some states in derivative actions. Because of the abuses inherent in deriva-
tive suits, a number of states have sought to deter such suits through a
variety of procedural restrictions."' These devices have served as effective
deterrents in state court actions, and defendants in federal court deriva-
tive actions based on lob-5 violations have sought to impose similar re-
quirements in the federal forum."4 As in Borak, the federal courts have
refused to engraft these restrictions on lob-5 actions.8s
Although decided prior to Borak, one of the leading cases for this prop-
osition is McClure v. Borne Chemical Co." The defendant asserted three
grounds for applying the state security for expenses requirement in the
lob-5 action:87 (1) state law rather than federal law controls this issue,
(2) even if federal law applies, security for expenses may be required
under the principles of "general federal equity law," and (3) a security
for expenses requirement should be implied from section 1ob-5 by analogy
to other provisions of the Act which authorize security for expenses when
a private right of action is expressly authorized. These three assertions
cover the range of contentions which have been advanced in lob-5 ac-
tions as reasons for applying state rather than federal law.
The first of these assertions was complicated by the fact that the fed-
eral court was sitting in Pennsylvania and dealing with a corporation
which was incorporated in New Jersey and had its principal place of
business in New Jersey. Both states have security for expenses require-
" Stella v. Kaiser, 221 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955).
80Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135
F. Supp. 176, 198 (D. Del. 1955), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
"5Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964) (SEA § 16(b)).
82 Id. at 109; cf. Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962) (utilized state law on election of remedies). But see Kohler v. Koh-
ler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963): "State court decisions involving fraud and misrepre-
sentation are applicable only indirectly as supplementary aids in establishing standards of diligence."83 H. HENN, supra note 66, §§ 352, 360-62, 374.
84See generally Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits Under Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1966).
8"E.g., Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967); Weitzen v. Kearns, 262 F. Supp. 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Epstein v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 388 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968);
Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 5S9 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see cases cited in
BROMBECRG 2.5(2) n.109.
86 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).87 Id. at 827.
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ments, so there was an additional question of which state law would be ap-
plied. In resolving this issue the court, without realizing it, was forced to
make the two-stage determination of (a) whether the applicability of
security for expenses is a federal question and (b) if so, whether the fed-
eral court should apply state law or a separate federal rule.
The principal argument for applying the Pennsylvania security for ex-
penses requirement was that under Erie the law of the forum state ap-
plied."8 Since the action arose under a federal statute which expressly con-
fers jurisdiction on the federal courts, the Third Circuit easily disposed
of the Erie rationale, for special federal question jurisdiction like that
conferred by section 27 of the Exchange Act "' is not subject to the
dictates of Erie."
The defendants also sought to have the federal court apply the Penn-
sylvania security for expenses requirement by analogy to the cases in
which federal courts have presumed that congressional silence on a funda-
mental principle of law indicates that Congress intended the courts to look
to state law on that matter. 1 Going to the question of whether the courts
should look to state law as a matter of federal law, this contention was
easily rejected as inapposite." When Congress fails to provide a statutory
rule on a fundamental and universally accepted principle of law, the
federal courts will presume that Congress intended state law to govern."
However, security for expenses requirements are neither fundamental nor
universally accepted, 4 so there is no basis for inferring a congressional
intention to apply state provisions."
The Third Circuit found the question of whether to apply the New
Jersey security for expenses requirement more difficult." As the state of
incorporation and the principal place of business, New Jersey had a sub-
stantial interest in the shareholder's rights and in the relationship between
the corporation and its shareholders. This relationship, as well as the very
existence, rights, and powers of the corporation, was a creation of New
Jersey corporate law and reflected strong New Jersey public policies on a
shareholder's rights and powers vis-d-vis the corporation. In enacting its
security for expenses requirement, New Jersey had indicated a policy of
limiting the shareholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation.
When federal courts allow shareholders to sue without posting security,
they are overriding state policy. In addition, the federal courts encourage
forum shopping, for the plaintiff who cannot bring his action in state
court without posting security for expenses will choose the federal forum,
8
'Id. at 830.
89 See note 15 supra.
90 E.g., in diversity jurisdiction and on state claims in federal court pendent to federal claims.
See note 34 supra.
91 292 F.2d at 830; cf. discussion of this point as it relates to statutes of limitations at note 116
infra.
92 Id.
9 See text accompanying note 116 inffra.
"
4 Cf. BROMBERG § 2.5(2) nn.108-09; 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 43A (1960).
"5Also, at the time Congress enacted § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, no security for expenses
requirement had been enacted. 292 F.2d at 830.
99 Id. at 831.
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not so much for its broader substantive rules as for its procedural advan-
tages. These procedural advantages are not, however, the reason for al-
lowing actions under lob-5; the private right of action is designed to pro-
vide investors with additional substantive rights, not just to make it easier
for them to get into court.
To avoid these effects, the federal courts could hold that the question
of a shareholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation is to be de-
termined by reference to the law of the state of incorporation. Thus the
shareholder's rights to bring a suit on behalf of the corporation would be
identical in both the state and the federal forum. Since the right being as-
serted is that of the corporation and not the individual shareholder, the
substantive rights afforded by lob-5 would not be affected by this ap-
proach, for the reference to state law would not affect the merits of the
corporation's claim. All that would be affected is the question of who
shall raise that claim and what must be done to raise it. Because the secur-
ity for costs requirements differ among the states, there of course would
be a lack of uniformity among the federal district courts. This lack of
uniformity, however, would not be serious, for the rule applicable to
suits on behalf of a particular corporation would be the same regardless of
the court in which the action were brought. Since the rule would be tied
to the state of incorporation (of which most corporations have only one),"7
a shareholder suing on behalf of the corporation would face the same re-
quirements wherever he brought his suit."
In McClure, however, the Third Circuit refused to make this reference
to state law," and that result has been followed in subsequent actions.00
Instead of viewing the shareholder's rights to maintain a derivative suit as
flowing from state corporate law, the court quoted extensively from a
Second Circuit opinion involving a derivative suit under the Interstate
Commerce Act, which took the view that the shareholder's right to main-
tain suit on behalf of the corporation is a federally conferred right and is
not subject to the peculiarities of state law."' The federal provisions, the
McClure court reasoned, "are a part of a statutory scheme which had as
its purpose the creation of a new federal law of management-stockholder
relations . . . ,,... If the state policies of management-shareholder rela-
tionships reflected by the security for expenses requirements were en-
grafted upon the 1ob-5 action, those policies would cut across the simi-
" For the comparatively small number of corporations which are incorporated in more than
one state, this approach might not necessarily be helpful.
" This approach would be in conformity with the usual conflict of laws rule applicable to deriva-
tive suits. When a shareholder seeks to enforce a right on behalf of the corporation, the forum will
look to the law of the state of incorporation to determine the shareholder's standing to sue. See
Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Contra, Levitt v. Johnson,
334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
99292 F.2d at 831-36.
s"'Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967); Weitzen v. Kearns, 262 F. Supp. 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd sub nora. Epstein v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 388 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968);
Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
'o' Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub non. Ogden Corp. v. Fielding,
340 U.S. 817 (1950).




lar federal interests embodied in the securities acts and would thus "se-
verely limit" the scope of lob-5 in the federal regulatory scheme... "Thus
state interest in the present suit must be subordinated to the federal pol-
icy occupying the same field."''. 4
Even if state law is inapplicable, the defendants in McClure argued, se-
curity for expenses should be required either under general federal equity
law or by implication from the express liability provisions of the securi-
ties laws which impose such requirements." 5 The court, however, rejected
this argument, principally upon the ground that such an extraordinary
requirement should not be imposed without express statutory authority. "
After reviewing the security for expenses required by other provisions in
the securities acts,' 7 the court concluded that the acts did not "manifest
[a] sufficiently clear or uniform policy favoring security for expenses to
allow us to imply such a limitation from Section 10 (b) .....
Even though security for expenses is not required on 10b-5 claims, the
McClure reasoning does not mean that security for expenses is never re-
quired in federal actions. If the plaintiff asserts claims arising under state
law pendent to his lob-5 claims, any security for expenses requirements
imposed by state courts will also be imposed in the federal court.' Thus
the plaintiff who asserts too many claims may find that his attempt to
avoid state security for expenses requirements by going to federal court
was useless, for he will have to meet the state requirements on his state
claims just as he would if he had not alleged the lob-5 violation. As mas-
ter of the action, however, the plaintiff can easily avoid this result by
failing to allege his claims under state law." Of course, if he does this and
then loses on his lob-5 claims, the plaintiff may be unable to assert his
state claims in a subsequent state court action."'
Although security for expenses is the most notable example, the states
which have sought to deter derivative suits have used several different
devices for this purpose."' As might be expected, these devices also are
inapplicable to derivative actions brought in federal court under lob-5.
Thus the extent of the demand which a shareholder must make on the
officers, directors, and other shareholders prior to instituting suit is a
question of federal law, and failure to satisfy state requirements does not
defeat the plaintiff's right."' However, it should be noted that denominat-
ing a specific matter a federal question still does not require the federal




507 Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964); SEA § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964);
SEA § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
50' 292 F.2d at 837.
"0 E.g., Weitzen v. Kearns, 262 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd sub noma. Epstein v. Soli-
tron Devices, Inc., 388 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); BROMBERG § 2.5(2) n.109.
"' Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. Matheson v. Armbrust,
284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961).
... See the discussion of res judicata and collateral estoppel at section III infra.
112 H. HENN, supra note 66, §§ 360-62.
"'aLevitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (In-
vestment Company Act of 1940).
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court to reach a result favorable to the plaintiff. Any state requirement
which the federal court desires to impose in lob-5 actions may still be
imposed. All that the doctrine which has developed around lob-$ means
is that a federal court has discretion to decide the shareholder's right to
bring the suit as a matter of federal law. Thus the federal court is not
bound to follow state law, as it would be in situations within the Erie
doctrine,"" but the federal court, in its discretion to choose the proper
federal rule, may reach the same result as a state court would.
Statute of Limitations. Like all good things, a cause of action arising under
10b-5 must come to an end. However, because it was not intended as a
foundation for a private cause of action, the statutory basis for this action
affords no period of limitations applicable to actions arising under the
rule."' Unless the cause of action is to run forever, the federal courts must
find some device for applying a statute of limitations to the 10b-5 action.
Fortunately-or unfortunately-the Supreme Court has evolved a rule
applicable to this situation. When Congress creates a right of action but
fails to provide an applicable period of limitations, the courts presume
that the congressional silence means that the state statute of limitations is
to apply, for it is unlikely that Congress intended to create a right not
subject to limitations, and there is no general federal statute of limitations
to fill the void."' Thus, a federal court must look to state law to determine
the statute of limitations applicable to the lob-5 action." ' But what state's
statute should be applied? That of the forum, or should some conflict of
laws rule be utilized to choose among the statutes of several states? And
after the state is determined, what limitation period of that state should
be utilized? Furthermore, when does the statute begin to run, and when
is it tolled? And finally, does the equitable doctrine of laches apply, and,
if so, is it determined by state or federal law?
The possibilities for confusion are almost limitless. Reflecting this fact, a
good deal of litigation has arisen involving these questions. Interestingly,
the courts have clung tenaciously to the Supreme Court's notion that state
law should apply when no express limitations period is prescribed in the
statute, but in all other areas under 10b-5 in which conflicts have arisen
between federal and state law, the federal courts have been quick to re-
ject the state rules on the ground that a separate federal rule is necessary
to provide uniformity in the enforcement of the federal right."8 Appar-
ently, it is critical to the national regulatory scheme to have a federal rule
on the important issue of whether a plaintiff can recover prejudgment in-
"'See Mishkin, supra note 38, at 798-808.
"5 See BROMBERO § 2.5(1); cf. Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 3 Loss
1773-74.
"'UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461
(1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895); cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1964); 3 Loss 1771-77; Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963). See also Note, Federal Statutes
Witbot Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1953).
1" See Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in 1 Ob-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion,
13 WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1967).
.5. E.g., remedies, note 60 supra; security for expenses, note 85 supra; cf. note 82 supra.
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terest,"' but it is unnecessary to have uniformity on such a mundane issue
as whether the plaintiff can assert his cause of action.
Choice of States. When a defense of limitations is raised in a 1ob-5 ac-
tion, one of the initial problems for the district court is the question of
which state's limitations period is to be applied. Under the Supreme Court
doctrine requiring the court to look to the state period, it is the statute of
limitations of the state in which the federal district court is sitting which
governs."' Because federal district judges usually are familiar with the
law of the forum state, this approach ensures that the court will have
little difficulty applying the limitations period correctly. However, the
presupposition underlying federal court jurisdiction under the Exchange
Act is that the transaction under consideration has some interstate con-
nections."' To confer jurisdiction under the Act, these interstate connec-
tions may be trifling, but many fraudulent schemes or acts have substan-
tial relations with several states. Because of the breadth of the personal
jurisdiction and venue provisions in the Act,' the plaintiff may be able to
use any of these states as the forum for his 1ob-5 action. Due to the great
diversity among the states on the time in which the plaintiff must bring
his action, the plaintiff's action may be barred under the limitations period
of some of the states yet still be viable under the period of other states.
Thus the tardy plaintiff may forum shop among the federal district courts
in order to find a forum state law which will allow him to maintain his
lob-5 action.' Not only does this situation underscore the lack of uni-
formity created by resort to state law, but it constitutes an improper use
of lob-5 as well. When used in this manner, lob-5 becomes no more than
a procedural trick to get the plaintiff into a court. The broad substantive
rights afforded investors by the implied right of action are secondary here
to the slippery jurisdictional features of the Exchange Act. In allowing
the plaintiff to pick and choose the applicable statute of limitations by
hinging that choice on the state in which the court happens to sit, the
courts have turned these jurisdictional features into little erasers by which
plaintiffs can wipe out the consequences of their own inefficiency.
One technique for avoiding this misuse is resort to some conflict of
laws rule whereby a given cause of action would be governed by one
statute of limitations regardless of the forum state of the federal court
hearing the suit. For example, the federal court, like a state court apply-
ing a conflict of laws rule in a tort action,"' could determine the federal
district having the most significant relationship with the action and could
then apply the statute of limitations which that district court would ap-
12 See note 80 supra.
"2Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282
F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Trussell v. United Underwriters,
Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); cf. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp.
801 (D. Colo. 1964).
22 See note 3 supra.
.22 See note 7 supra.
223 See note 69 supra.
224 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
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ply. This approach would insure that, no matter where the plaintiff
chooses to file his suit, the period of limitations applicable to his 1ob-s
action would be the same.' 2'
A result similar to this was recently suggested in dictum by a Colorado
federal district court.' There the alleged misrepresentation had occurred
in Kansas, where the sale of securities was made. Concluding that the
cause of action thus arose in Kansas, the federal court nevertheless looked
to Colorado law to determine the applicable statute of limitations. How-
ever, Colorado has a "borrowing statute" which precludes maintenance of
actions arising in another state when the action would be barred in that
other state,"' and the court reasoned that the Kansas period of limitations
therefore would apply."' This latter approach has been sanctioned by the
United States Supreme Court in a case involving the National Banking
Act but which presented the same problems as lob-5."'
Choice of Time Period. After the court has determined which state's
statute of limitations governs, the next question is which limitations period
of that state applies. To determine this, the court must delve rather deep-
ly into policy considerations, both federal and state, for any limitations
period merely reflects a policy determination of how long the plaintiff
may wait before commencing his action. Reflecting differing policies to-
ward different types of actions, all states have more than one period of
limitations; yet the doctrine by which the federal courts refer to state
law for the applicable statute of limitations provides no device for deter-
mining which of the various periods applies.' Clearly, it would be inap-
propriate for a court to apply a statute such as a twenty-year statute ap-
plicable to adverse possession of land in the 10b-5 action, but the choice
among the various tort and commercial periods is not always easy. Because
the question is a federal one, it is up to the federal courts to pick and
choose among the provisions and to try to find the period most appropri-
ate in effectuating the national policies behind lob-5."' Thus the federal
court is taking state statutes, reflecting state policies, and applying them so
as to further federal policies. The result often is not blessed with clarity.
The choice of limitations problem which has arisen most frequently has
been whether to apply a state limitations period for actions based on fraud
or a period for actions based on statutory liability. Because the private
right of action based on 10b-5 is quite similar to common law concepts of
fraud and deceit,' the state limitations period for fraud actions may re-
flect state policy considerations most closely analagous to those underly-
ing lob-5."33 On the other hand, the liability imposed under 10b-5 fre-
... See also text accompanying note 97 supra.
12Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964).
127 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-19 (1963).
12236 F. Supp. at 803.
12 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
' See cases cited note 116 supra.
... Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp.
1178 (D. Ark. 1969); Schulman, supra note 117, at 640.
12 See BROMBERG 5 2.7(1).
"3 But see id. § 2.5(1) n.105.
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quently would not exist except for its statutory basis."3 ' In this situation,
therefore, it can be argued that the limitations period for liability created
by statute should govern. Actually, neither analysis holds up completely,
for lob-5 simply does not fit the neat little slots constructed by state law.
If, however, a slot must be found, the fraud analogy is probably the
better approach, and that is the choice made by most federal courts.' The
rule prohibits employing devices, schemes or artifices to defraud, making
untrue or misleading statements, and engaging in practices which operate
as a fraud or deceit."a By this language, the Commission apparently sought
to prohibit the sort of conduct already recognized under state law as
fraud or misrepresentation. Thus when the rule is violated, the conduct
involved is the sort to which a state court probably would apply its sta-
tute of limitations applicable to fraud or misrepresentation. This close
connection between conduct which violates lob-5 and common law fraud
led the Ninth Circuit, in Fratt v. Robinson,"' to hold that the lob-5
action was one "for relief upon the ground of fraud" and thus came
within the Washington six-year limitations period rather than a two-year
period which applies to actions "for relief not hereinbefore provided
for.'... Although the defendant argued that the action arose from a sta-
tute, the court, relying on several decisions of the Washington supreme
court, reasoned that it was the fraud which offended the statute.9
Here is not a governmental statutory denouncement of a human action
heretofore undenounced, such as a violation of a wartime price for a com-
modity. Fraud is denounced in all its phases by federal and state and the
common law. There are statutes with restrictions and limitations as to actions
under it, but such actions do not arise out of nor upon a statute ...."
Fratt now seems ensconced as authority for the proposition that state
limitations periods applicable to fraud govern the lob-5 action.14' In fact,
it has now achieved that somewhat dubious role as authority which can
be cited by the court without any further discussion of the point or the
applicability of the reasoning."1 ' Since Fratt was based on an interpretation
14 I.e., 1ob-5 may make illegal conduct which would be sanctioned at common law. Therefore,
the liability which is being imposed would not exist except for iob-5. Cf. Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279
F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
"' Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d
97 (6th Cir. 1967); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783
(2d Cir. 1951); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); cf. Schulman,
supra note 117, at 641-42, and cases cited therein.
ISO Cf. note 3 supra.
137203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).




1 Id.; cf. Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 63-64 (N.D. Ohio 1959): "[T]he incorpora-
tion of a common-law right of action into a statute or rule . . . does not create a liability that
would not exist except for the statute."
... Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), is also commonly cited for
this proposition. However, the one-paragraph consideration given there to the choice of the applica-
ble limitations period was rather cursory. Id. at 787; cf. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th
Cir. 1956).
43 E.g., Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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of a Washington statute, however, it would seem that any decision on
which limitation period should govern requires a consideration of the spe-
cific language of the state statutes of limitations. Without such an analy-
sis of the limitations question, it is impossible to be certain what criteria
the court is utilizing to choose the fraud statute. For example, in Azalea
Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, a recent case arising in the Fifth Circuit, the dis-
trict court 43 rejected Fratt and its train of following cases'" because under
Florida law an action brought under a statute is governed by the limita-
tion period applicable to liability created by statute, even though the
action is similar to one existing at common law.'4 On appeal, the court1"
rejected this notion, reasoning that the gravamen of a lob-S action is
fraud. " "[A] state statute of limitations should not be permitted to nar-
row the filing time available under a broadly remedial federal act to a
period less than the one available for commencing a similar common-law
action.' ', 4  To support this reasoning, the court quoted, somewhat irrele-
vantly, from a Supreme Court opinion... to the effect that the purpose
behind the federal securities laws is to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for that of caveat emptor."' By this approach, the Fifth Circuit
seems to say that state law provisions are irrelevant; the applicable limi-
tations period is always at least that which the state would apply to a
fraud action at common law. This goes one step beyond what the courts
have done in previous lob-5 actions. Though acknowledging that the
choice of the applicable limitations period is a matter of federal law, most
courts, in looking to state law have been willing to follow the language
of the state statutes in deciding which period is applicable."' Azalea
Meats," however, suggests that the Fifth Circuit, having concluded as a
matter of federal law that lob-5 is a fraud action, will look to state law
only for the length of time applicable to fraud actions and without re-
gard for any other periods prescribed by state law."'
Blue Sky Limitation Periods. Most states now have a blue sky law, many
of which prohibit the same types of conduct condemned by 10b-5, and
some of which expressly authorize a private action for investors injured
by that conduct."4 Where such actions are provided, it may be appropri-
ate for the federal court to consider the limitation period contained in the
state blue sky law as the period governing 10b-5 actions."' Since the pe-
14' Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
'" Cases cited note 135 supra.
14 246 F. Supp. at 782. However, the point was largely academic, for the limitations period
both for the common law fraud statute and for liability created by statute is three years.
14'Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d ; (5th Cir. 1967).
'"Id. at 8.
148 id.
"4SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
"'386 F.2d at 8.
551 Schulman, supra note 117, at 642.
"' Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'g 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.
Fla. 1965).
"' This ignores the question of whether lob-s is really similar to a common law fraud action.
See text accompanying note 161 infra.
154 See generally L. Loss & E. COWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 138-42 (1958).
"'See BROMnERG § 2.5(1) n.105.
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riods contained in these statutes are usually shorter than those applicable
to common law fraud actions, some defendants have urged that they be
applied by the federal court. The first two cases to consider this conten-
tion"" rejected the blue sky limitations periods. In Charney v. Thomas.5
the Sixth Circuit rejected the statute of limitations in the Michigan blue
sky law on the ground that the act contained no provision similar to sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Similarly, the period in the Colorado
blue law was rejected by a district court in Trussell v. United Underwrit-
ers, Ltd."' because the liability imposed in that act is more analogous to
the civil liability imposed by section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933""
than to liability imposed under lob-5. These cases in effect say that the
policies underlying the express liability provided by state blue sky laws
are not the same as the policies underlying the 10b-5 action, which is in
reality some sort of federal common law fraud action. In Charney, how-
ever, the court did not foreclose the possibility of using the blue sky limi-
tations period.'
Recently, a district court sitting in Arkansas adopted the blue sky pro-
vision of that state.'' In doing so, the court distinguished both Charney
and Trussell, though the basis for these distinctions is somewhat obscure.
Correctly, the court recognized that in choosing the proper limitations
period it should select the period "which best effectuates the federal pol-
icy.''. In choosing the shorter blue sky limitations period over that ap-
plicable to common law fraud, the court was impressed by the differ-
ence between the elements of the 10b-5 action and common law fraud
actions in Arkansas courts.' In Myzel v. Fields' the Eighth Circuit,
which Arkansas courts must follow, held that scienter is not an essential
element of proof in 10b-5 actions. Abolition of this element, which is at
the heart of the traditional common law action, the court noted,"' gives
10b-5 actions a substantially different character from state court actions
which still require proof of scienter. This difference, the court reasoned,
is sufficient to make the state limitations period for common law fraud in-
applicable.'" Trussell6 7 was distinguishable because the district court there
.5 Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
1"7 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
118 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
'59 Id. at 776.
16°"[I]n some cases the local Blue Sky Law might be the more appropriate point of reference
.... " Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967).
11 Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Ark. 1969). Arkansas has adopted the Uni-
form Securities Act, ARKx. STAT. ANN. §5 67-123 5 to -1262 (Repl. 1966), so the limitation period
was that applicable to actions under § 410 of the Uniform Securities Act. When the Uniform
Act was drawn, the commissioners specifically rejected the idea that an implied right of action
would be available under § 101 of the Act, which embodies the same language as rule lob-5. Uni-
form Securities Act § 410(h), Official Comrment. Thus, the only civil liability available under the
Act is that under § 410, which is analogous to the express liability provided in § 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964). See generally L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY
LAw 128-79, 250-51 (1958).
162294 F. Supp. at 1188.
'
6
3 Id. at 1191-92.
'e'386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
161294 F. Supp. at 1192.
le Id.
167 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
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was following a Tenth Circuit opinion... which required proof of scienter
in lob-5 actions, thus making the 10b-5 action analogous to common law
fraud."9
Even if the absence of the scienter element in 10b-5 actions makes the
fraud limitations period inapplicable, that does not make the blue sky
limitations period applicable--except by default. By seemingly circuitous
reasoning, however, the court concluded that lob-5 and the express liabil-
ity provision in the blue sky law were similar.7 ' The blue sky provision,
which is virtually identical to section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933,171 is actually the same as the second clause of rule lob-5Y. There-
fore, the court concluded that the short limitations period which is ap-
plicable to blue sky remedies, which are analogous to liability imposed by
section 12(2), is appropriate in the lob-5 action.'"
Tolling. Like a straight line, the period of limitations, once its length
has been determined, runs from one point to another. In deciding whe-
ther an action is barred by limitations, therefore, the court must decide
from what point in time the period runs. Determining this point is a
matter of federal law, which the federal courts decide by reference to
federal policies without particular regard for state tolling rules, even
though the state rules would affect the period of limitations chosen by
the court. 4 When fraud is involved in a federal action, the statute of lim-
itations does not begin to run until either the fraud has been actually dis-
covered or should have been discovered by the plaintiff.' In a lob-5 action,
because fraud is involved, this federal tolling doctrine comes into play.'
Thus, if the applicable state period of limitations is two years, that period
does not run until the plaintiff diligently should have discovered the fraud,
even though it might take active concealment on the part of the defend-
ant to toll the same limitations period in a state court action.'
From the standpoint of effecting federal policies, this use of a federal
tolling doctrine clearly is appropriate. Without it, the antifraud policies
of the federal law could be frustrated by short state limitations periods
which would run even though the plaintiff had no knowledge of the
fraud.
However, use of a separate federal tolling doctrine is not completely
1"8 Rice v. United States, 149 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1945).
169294 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
170 Id.
171 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
172 294 F. Supp. at 1190; see note 3 supra.
17 3 1d.; cf. Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
174Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (lst
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). But see Butterman v. Steiner, 343 F.2d 519 (7th Cir.
1965), and Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956), which looked to state law on the
tolling question.
" Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (1875); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80
(2d Cir.), ert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961); see Schulman, supra note 117, at 639.
"'8Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 970 (2d Cir. 1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 265, 275 (1963); cf. Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
.
7 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). For
a discussion of due diligence, see Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967).
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satisfactory. In using the state limitations period, the court is adopting a
set of state policies reflecting the length of time in which an action should
be brought. However, the policies behind the state tolling provisions are
at least as important as those behind the time period. A state may pass
an exceptionally short statute of limitations but allow it to be freely
tolled and achieve a result roughly similar to a long time period which is
not so freely tolled. When the federal courts utilize their own tolling doc-
trine, they reject the latter part of the state policies behind the limitation
period and thus may achieve an overall result much different from that
of the state court. If the rationale behind resort to state law is that Con-
gress presumably intended the state statute of limitations to apply, 7 ' it
would seem that the federal courts should look to the total policy behind
the state law, including tolling provisions, so that the federal court appli-
cation of the state statute of limitations would reach the same substantive
result as that of a state court.'
Laches. The choice of the appropriate statute of limitations is impor-
tant when the action is purely legal in character, but when some form of
equitable relief is sought, the limitation of that aspect of the plaintiff's
action is governed by the equitable doctrine of laches."' In Holnberg v.
Armbrecht.. Justice Frankfurter observed that statutes of limitations do
not control equitable relief and are "drawn upon by equity solely for the
light they may shed" in determining whether the plaintiff has slept on
his rights."' Although laches has been held inapplicable to some civil liabil-
ity actions under the Securities Act of 1933,"' the courts have held this
equitable doctrine applicable to lob-5 actions because the rights accruing
under the rule "are enforceable at law and in equity.''84 In 10b-5 actions,
however, the courts have not yet indicated whether this doctrine is that
of the forum state or a federal concept of laches. In the one case which
has raised this question, ss the district court judge concluded that both
federal and state doctrines were the same, so the question was academic.
From Justice Frankfurter's language in Holmberg, however, it seems that
federal doctrine should apply."' When the equity jurisdiction of the court
is invoked in aid of its legal jurisdiction, the equitable action should not
survive the legal right, since equity follows the law." ' But when the equi-
table jurisdiction of the court can be invoked independently, as the cases
178 See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
179 Of course, because tolling here is a federal question, there is no requirement that the federal
court reach the same substantive result as that of a state court, which would be the case if the
Erie doctrine applied. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra; note 34 supra.
'8Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
1s Id.
."Id. at 396.
83 E.g., Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961); cf.
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
... Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327 (D. Del. 1956),
aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957); see Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
"S'Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968).
'"Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
"8 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Transamerica Corp.,
143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957).
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suggest it can be in 10b-5 actions,' the federal court must make its own
determination of whether to follow state law.
III. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
After a state or federal court has entered a judgment in a securities
fraud action, a new question of federal-state relations arises: what is the
effect of that judgment upon an action pending in another forum? In
general, this situation invokes the well-developed concepts of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, which serve to preclude litigation of matters al-
ready decided.189
Res Judicata. The federal courts have split over the question of whether
a prior state court action is res judicata as to a subsequent lob-5 action.' 9
Since the res judicata effect attaches only if the prior adjudication was on
the same cause of action, the central question in these cases is whether
the state proceeding involved the same cause of action as the federal court
proceeding under 10b-5. If the prior action was unrelated to securities
fraud, naturally the causes of action are different.' However, if the state
suit was a common law action for misrepresentation in the securities trans-
action, it is much more difficult to decide whether 10b-5 is a separate cause
of action from the state proceeding or is merely a different theory of re-
covery on the same cause of action.
Determining what constitutes a cause of action is a difficult question
for the courts in all areas, 9" and securities fraud cases are no exception. In
the earliest case clearly in point, Connelly v. Balkwill,"'9 a district court in
Ohio concluded that a prior fraud action in Ohio was res judicata as to
the 10b-5 action before it-or at least that collateral estoppel precluded
relitigation of the subject matter of the suit. The court based its reasoning
concerning the res judicata point on the similarity between the duty im-
posed by Ohio law and the duty under lob-5.9 4 Concluding that the
Ohio fraud standards were as stringent as the 10b-5 standards, the court
held that the lob-5 action was based on a cause of action no different
from that in the prior state action.""
In Connelly the court apparently viewed the standard of duty imposed
as the talisman for defining "cause of action." In a recent case,' " however,
the Second Circuit suggested that a state action based on a breach of fi-
duciary duty would not be res judicata in the lob-5 action. The Second
Circuit's reasoning, though dictum, was based on the fact that the state
"'See cases cited at note 184 supra.
'"' See generally 3 Loss 1796; Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect
of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REN-. 1360 (1967).
'"Compare, e.g., Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d
685 (6th Cit. 1960), with Abramson v. Pennwood Invest. Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968).
'' Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 957-59 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
192 l MOORE 0.410[1].
1 174 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); see Note, supra
note 189, at 1370-71.
14 174 F. Supp. at 55-60.
'95 Id. at 60.
196 Abramson v. Pennwood Investment Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968).
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court could not hear the lob-5 claims.19' Since those claims are cognizable
only in federal court, the court concluded that the lob-5 claims repre-
sented a different cause of action, which the outcome of the state pro-
ceedings could not bar as res judicata."'
If this jurisdictional test employed by the Second Circuit is correct, a
state determination can never be res judicata in a 10b-5 action, for a state
court can never hear the lob-5 claims."9 Other cases, however, have not
utilized such a mechanical test and have found that res judicata applies
despite the fact that the lob-5 claims could not be raised in the state
action."'8
In Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp. of America' Judge Metzner dis-
tinguished between the wrong done and the theory of recovery advanced.
Characterizing lob-5 as merely a different theory of recovery from the
breach of fiduciary duty alleged in the state action, he reasoned that "res
judicata applies if the legal wrong done by the impact of the same facts
was the same in the two cases."'' In most cases this characterization of the
right infringed is accurate. In both the federal and the state actions the
plaintiff is complaining of the same fraudulent conduct in connection with
a securities transaction. Ordinarily, the only difference between the con-
tentions in the two actions is the basis on which the plaintiff seeks to
recover. In the state action he alleges that a duty owed to him under com-
mon law has been breached; in the federal court he contends a rule pro-
hibiting this sort of conduct has been violated. In this context, therefore,
the lob-5 action looks very much like nothing more than a statutory ver-
sion of common law fraud.
The "right infringed" theory of what constitutes a cause of action con-
forms to that utilized in some non-securities cases, where the focus has
been on the right infringed rather than the form of the action,"a but it
apparently is based on notions of procedure which are inapplicable in se-
curities fraud situations. In making "cause of action" hinge on the right
infringed rather than on the theory of recovery, the courts assume that
modern procedural devices permit the parties to advance all of their
theories in the same proceeding."' In most actions, joinder of pleadings
and compulsory counterclaims require the litigants to assert all of their
claims in one proceeding, and fairness to the parties dictates that matters
not raised there should not be advanced later. Under the older notions of
forms of action, however, the definition of cause of action was of necessity
much narrower.'' If all of the theories of recovery could not be advanced
in the first proceeding, res judicata would not preclude subsequent litiga-
197 Id. at 762; cf. text accompanying note 22 supra.
'98 392 F.2d at 762.
199 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
"0 Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966); Dembitzer v. First Re-
public Corp. of America, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1965).
20' CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1965).
202 Id.





tion between the parties.2" The jurisdictional provisions of the SEA sug-
gest that this older view is more applicable to securities actions than the
modern approach."7 Since the plaintiff cannot raise his lob-5 claims in a
state court, the modern procedural devices promoting joinder are irrele-
vant; he cannot have his day in court on his federal claims without going
into federal court.
Collateral Estoppel. If res judicata does not attach to a prior state fraud
action, the question remains whether its sister doctrine of collateral estop-
pel may prevent relitigation of the matters litigated in the state court. "
When both federal and state actions are based on the same transaction,
collateral estoppel should apply. Recognizing this, several courts, when
invoking res judicata to bar lob-5 actions, have suggested that the nar-
rower doctrine of collateral estoppel would also apply so as to defeat the
federal action."' Since both federal and state actions are concerned with
the fraud or misrepresentation of the defendants, the issues raised and the
proof offered will be virtually the same in both actions. If for no other
reason, the simple dictates of judicial economy require that once the evi-
dence is presented on these issues and the facts are determined, there is
no need to make another determination."'
Applied in the cases which have invoked res judicata, however, col-
lateral estoppel probably would not have precluded the lob-5 litigation.
The rationale behind the doctrine is that the issues have been subjected
to the adversary process of resolution in a prior action. Thus, according
to Professor Moore, default judgments, consent judgments, and judgments
upon stipulations should not be given effect under collateral estoppel, for
the issues determined there lack the test of judicial inquiry (i.e., the issues
in reality have not been litigated)."' The recent securities cases raising the
question of res judicata all represent attempts by shareholders to prosecute
derivative suits under lob-5 when prior state derivative suits had been
settled.21' If Moore is correct, collateral estoppel should not attach to the
issues involved in these settlements, so the plaintiffs would not be estop-
ped from raising them in the lob-5 actions. If res judicata can be applied,
however, even the settlements will preclude subsequent actions, for res
judicata attaches finality to all such judgments. 1 ' Although this distinc-
tion betwen res judicata and collateral estoppel may be somewhat artificial,
the courts apparently felt constrained to find that the prior state pro-
ceedings were res judicata in order to prevent relitigation of the issues
26 See Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).2 0 I.e., a state court could not require joinder of the lob-5 claims with common law claims.
See note 22 supra.
208 1B MOORE 5 0.441.
0' Abramson v. Pennwood Invest. Corp., 392 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1968); Boothe v. Baker Indus.,
Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Ohio 1959),
aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
210 IB MOORE 0.444.
211 Id. 5 0.442[1].
..1 Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968); Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp. of
America, CCH FFm. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cases cited note 209 supra.
21s 1n MOORE 5 0.409.
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raised in the state courts. In these cases, however, there were strong
grounds for precluding relitigation. In several, the plaintiffs either had an
opportunity to intervene in the state proceeding but declined or actually
participated in the state court action."4 In none of the cases had the de-
rivative action failed on its merits. Therefore, it can be argued that only
the Connelly"' decision stands as a case in which a 10b-5 action was dis-
missed because a prior state action had resolved the fraud issues on the
merits. The question of whether a prior state action is res judicata on the
10b-5 claims, therefore, is probably still open.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court dictum in Borak,10 now backed by a number of
lower court opinions, clearly establishes the overriding importance of fed-
eral law in 10b-5 actions. When a question of procedure arises, therefore,
the adoption of the proper rule is a matter of federal law. Of less cer-
tainty is the extent to which the federal courts will look to state law in
deciding these federal questions. Arthur Fleischer has observed that state
law is inapplicable only when it "impedes the congressional purpose,.217
and some cases have rejected state law which "cuts across" the federal
rights."1 Determining when state law does "cut across" the federal right
is of course the critical question. To a large extent this determination
hinges on the substantive make up of the federal rights. Before deciding
whether the congressional purpose would be impeded or the federal right
"cut across," the court must decide what that congressional purpose or
those federal rights are.
The cases which have been decided, however, do indicate the power of
the federal law to override state procedural requirements. In rejecting ap-
praisal as the exclusive remedy for shareholders who dissent from a mer-
ger,21 the cases suggest that even very strong state policies are irrelevant.
In making appraisal the exclusive relief for shareholders, the states have
indicated a strong policy against shareholder interference with merger
transactions, except as authorized by statute. The willingness of the fed-
eral courts to ignore this exclusive relief suggests that state policies toward
shareholders are relevant only if they happen to conform to federal poli-
cies. From the results of the cases, it is apparent that this means that state
policies designed to restrict the rights of shareholders and other investors
will be rejected, whereas those designed for the protection of that group
probably will be adopted.
The rejection of state procedural requirements for derivative suits is a
further indication of the unwillingness of the federal courts to follow
214 Cases cited note 212 supra; cf. Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573,
(W.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968).
"'aConnelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir.
1960).
210 J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964).
217 Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1170 (1965).
218 E.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 835 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961).
219 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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state policies which restrict the rights of investors."2 ' In McClure v. Borne
Chemical Co."' the Third Circuit carried this notion one step further
when it stated that the shareholder's right to sue under lob-5 in behalf
of the corporation arises independently of state law. It perhaps would
have been reasonable to conclude that a shareholder's right to sue on
behalf of the corporation is a question of state law since the relationship
of the shareholder to the corporation is ordinarily a creation of the law
of the state of incorporation. In rejecting this argument, the court thus
indicated that even on this fundamental question of corporation-share-
holder relations, federal law is supreme.
The notable exception to this rejection of state law concepts in 10b-5
actions is the choice of the applicable limitations period of the state where
the federal court is sitting."' With federal courts sitting in fifty different
states, each with a somewhat different policy toward limitation of actions,
this resort to state law is an approach highly unlikely to produce uni-
formity in any sense of that term. Nevertheless, the doctrine is a venerable
one, and the Supreme Court recently affirmed it in the field of labor rela-
tions,2 which seems indistinguishable on this point from lob-5 actions.
The rationale behind this resort to state law is partly that there is no need
for uniformity on this issue and partly that the failure of Congress to pro-
vide a limitations period applicable to the lob-5 action indicates that Con-
gress intended for the state periods to apply. When considered against the
background of the exceptionally short limitations periods expressly pro-
vided in the securities laws, this second rationale seems unlikely. A more
plausible explanation for the failure of Congress to provide an express
limitation period for lob-5 actions is that Congress did not anticipate that
section 10 (b) of the Act (or a rule promulgated under it) would serve as
a foundation for a private right of action.2 4 Thus a much better approach
would be to fashion a separate federal period of limitations applicable to
10b-5 actions which would better reflect the policy of limitation of ac-
tions suggested by the short limitations periods contained in other provi-
sions of the securities laws. 2' Because of the venerable nature of the Su-
preme Court doctrine requiring resort to state limitations periods, how-
ever, there is little possibility that a federal limitations period properly
could be fashioned by the courts. Thus legislation probably is required to
eliminate the presumption.
The absence of a need for uniformity on the limitations period appli-
cable to lob-5 actions is also a questionable reason for resort to state law.
Although it is true that the question of limitations actually does not go to
20 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
221 292 F.2d 824, 832-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); cf. Levitt v. Johnson,
334 F.2d 815, 819 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (Investment Company Act
of 1940).
22 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
2'UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); see cases cited note 116 supra.
2Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13
WAYNE L. REv. 635, 649 (1967).
22 Id.; Note, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule iob-5: A Suggestion for Replacing
the Doctrine of Privily, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 685-86 (1965).
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the right created by federal law," the federal right has not been affected
in other areas in which the federal courts have rejected state rules in favor
of fashioning separate federal rules.22' The federal right involved is the
protection of investors from fraudulent activities, and the limitation of
the investor's action is not necessarily involved in that right. Nevertheless,
the possibilities for confusion associated with choosing and applying the
applicable state law 2.8 and the possibility of injustice associated with forum
shopping by virtue of section 27 of the Act .22 indicate that the question of
limitations has become inseparably tied up with the federal rights created
by lob-5. Thus the absence of a federal rule on this subject actually im-
pairs the federal right just as much as would application of state security
for expenses requirements. In short, this area is one in which a uniform na-
tional rule both would produce a more just result for the parties and
would be easier to apply.
Determining where res judicata and collateral estoppel fit into this
map of federal-state relations is still a somewhat ambiguous question. The
willingness of the federal courts to disregard state law concepts which im-
pede the plaintiff in bringing his 10b-5 action suggests that a prior state
adjudication should not bar the plaintiff's 10b-5 action. However, the
cases which have rejected state law have involved procedural questions
arising prior to judgment.2 ' Once a judgment is rendered, somewhat dif-
ferent considerations, based primarily on the need for finality in litigation,
become applicable. Once the plaintiff has had his day in court, he should
not be allowed to relitigate his action by finding another forum and
another theory of recovery. Nevertheless, a prior state adjudication prob-
ably should not bar the plaintiff in asserting his lob-5 claims, for the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over those claims means that
the plaintiff can never have his day in court on them until he is in federal
court. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction of course may be available to
permit the plaintiff to litigate both his federal and state claims in the
same forum if he files suit in federal court initially,221 but his failure to
utilize this aproach should not preclude him from asserting his federal
claims. 2 Section 28 of the Exchange Act preserves the plaintiff's rights
under state law,22 and the fact that he chooses to assert those rights in a
separate state action should not prejudice his rights under federal law.
22. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966).
227 E.g., security for expenses. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
228 See, e.g., text accompanying note 154 supra.
229 See text accompanying note 121 supra.
23OE.g., security for expenses, appraisal.
231 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
22 But see 1B MooE 5 0.410[2] n.38, at 1183.
233 See note 8 supra.
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